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NEGLIGENCE - ATTORNEY APPELLEES 
The Attorney Appellees owed a duty to Breanna Loveless 
pursuant to an attorney-client relationship. 
Count VII of Ricky Sanders' complaint alleges that the Attorney Appellees assumed 
duties to protect Breanna Loveless, as well as duties in loco parentis to assure her protection 
against abuse and life-threatning neglect, injury or illness; that the Attorney Appellees 
negligently breached their duties to Breanna Loveless; and that the Attorney Defendant's 
negligence was the cause in fact and legal cause of Breanna's death, [emphasis added] R. 16. 
Ricky Sanders position is that the duties assumed by the Defendant Attorneys to protect 
Breanna Loveless as well as any acts of negligence committed by the Attorney Appellees 
occurred strictly within the scope of their representation of Breanna Loveless in the David 
C lawsuit. Count VII of Ricky Sander's Complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim 
of action for which relief can be granted because the trial court ruled that the Attorney 
Appellees had no duty or responsibility to Breanna Loveless. R. 749 at 51. Therefore, the 
sole issue presented to this court relating to the Attorney Appellees is whether the Attorney 
Defendant's owed a duty to Breanna Loveless as a result of their representation of the class 
action plaintiffs in David C. Ricky Sanders position is that the Attorney Appellees had such 
a clear duty to Breanna Loveless that the Attorney Appellees refer to the statement of the 
duty as an axiom in their Appellee Brief. Attorney Appellees' Brief at 3. Therefore, the trial 
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court's ruling was grossly erroneous and the trial court's order should be overturned. 
The Attorney Appellees, on the other hand, erroneously state that Ricky Sanders pled 
that the Attorney Appellees proximately caused the death of Breanna Loveless by failing to 
protect her from abuse at the hands of her mother and her mother's boyfriend. Attorney 
Appellees' Brief at 1. They further erroneously state that the trial court ruled that the 
Attorney Appellees had no duty to protect Breanna Loveless from harm inflicted by third 
parties. Attorney Appellees' Brief at 1. The Attorney Appellees argue that Ricky Sanders 
failed to establish a duty that would hold them responsible for the acts of Breanna's mother 
and her [sic] boyfriend who were completely unknown to the Attorney Appellees. Attorney 
Appellees' Brief at 2-4. However, Ricky Sanders does not allege that the Attorney Appellees 
proximately caused the death of Breanna Loveless by failing to protect her from abuse at 
the hands of her mother and her mother's boyfriend. The trial court has never ruled that 
the Attorney Appellees had no duty to protect Breanna Loveless from harm inflicted by 
third parties. Ricky Sanders alleged that the Attorney Appellees assumed duties to protect 
Breanna, that the Attorney Appellees negligently breached their duties, that the Attorney 
Appellees' negligence was the proximate cause of Breanna's death, and that Breanna 
suffered damages as a result. R. 16. The trial ruled that the Attorney Appellees had no 
responsibility or duty in this matter, period, and granted the Attorney Appellees' Motion to 
Dismiss. R. 749 at 51. Therefore, Ricky Sander responds to the Attorney Appellee's 
argument by stating he feels no obligation to establish a duty that is not claimed. 
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Conclusion 
Because an attorney-client relationship existed between Breanna Loveless and Ricky 
Sanders clearly established that attorneys owe a duty to their clients, the trial court's ruling 
that the Attorney Appellees had no responsibility or duty to Breanna Loveless was grossly 
erroneous and the trial court's order should be overturned and Ricky Sanders' negligence 
claim against the Attorney Appellees should be remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings so that a determination can be made about whether the Attorney Appellees were 
in fact negligent in their representation of Breanna Loveless and if so, whether the Attorney 
Appellees' negligence was the proximate cause of Breanna's injuries. 
ISSUE 2 
NEGLIGENCE - MONITORING PANEL APPELLEES 
The Monitoring Panel Appellees owed Breanna Loveless a 
duty pursuant to the responsibilities it voluntarily assumed 
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. 
The issues of whether the plaintiff failed to properly file a Notice of Claim on the 
Monitoring Panel Appellees and whether the Monitoring Panel Appellees are entitled to 
immunity are not on appeal. The only issue on appeal relating to the Monitoring Panel 
Appellees is whether the Monitoring Panel Appellees owe a duty to Breanna Loveless. The 
Monitoring Appellees, like the Attorney Appellees, seem to argue that Ricky Sanders failed 
to establish a special relationship between the Monitoring Panel Appellees and Breanna 
Loveless that would require the Monitoring Panel Appellees to control the conduct of third 
persons. Monitoring Panel Appellees' Brief at 26-27. However, Ricky Sanders does not 
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claim that the Monitoring Panel Appellees were responsible for controlling the conduct of 
third persons. Ricky Sanders negligence claim against the Monitoring Panel Appellees is 
based solely on the undisputed facts that the Monitoring Panel was established pursuant to 
the Settlement Agreement to monitor and oversee the implementation of the Settlement 
Agreement and that Breanna Loveless was a beneficiary, if not a party, to the Settlement 
Agreement. R. 95-99, 198. Based on these undisputed facts, the Monitoring Panel 
Appellees owed Breanna Loveless a clear duty to skillfully, carefully, diligently and in a 
workmanlike manner perform the responsibilities the Monitoring Panel Appellees voluntarily 
assumed pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. Ricky Sanders clearly established the legal 
basis for that duty in his Appellant's Brief. 
Conclusion 
Because the Monitoring Panel Appellees voluntarily assumed responsibilities pursuant 
to a contract and Breanna Loveless was a beneficiary of, if not a party to, the contract, the 
trial court's ruling that the Monitoring Panel Appellees had no responsibility or duty to 
Breanna Loveless was grossly erroneous and the trial court s order should be overturned and 
the Ricky Sanders' negligence claim against the Monitoring Panel Appellees should be 
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings so that a determination can be made 
about whether the Monitoring Panel Appellees were in fact negligent in the performance of 
their responsibilities and if so, whether the Monitoring Panel Appellees' negligence was the 
proximate cause of Breanna's injuries. 
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ISSUE 3 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Point 1 
Ricky Sanders breach of contract claim may be raised as a 
separate action from the federal class action lawsuit and 
state court has proper jurisdiction. 
The State Appellees argue that the State Court has no jurisdiction to award damages 
for alleged breaches of a Federal Court settlement agreement. In support of its argument, the 
State Appellees cite the following cases: Klein v. Zavaras. 80 F.3d 432 (10th Cir. 1996), 
Figures v. Bd. of Pub. Util. of Kansas Citv, Kansas. 967 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1992), DeGidio 
v:lung,920F.2d525(8thCir. 19901 and Green v. McKaskle. 788 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1986). 
However, none of these cases address the issue at hand which is whether a breach of contract 
action may be brought in state court based on an agreement reached in a Federal Court 
action. All of the cases relied on by the State Appellees except for Figures hold that a 42 
U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action is not an appropriate means to seek enforcement of a Federal 
consent decree. These cases are inapplicable to this matter because Ricky Sanders is not 
attempting to enforce a consent decree through a 1983 civil rights action. Figures holds that 
a claim for injunctive relief can only be brought in the original case. In Figures, the plaintiff 
sought "damages and injunctive relief for violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 
U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, and paragraphs 2 and 5 of [a] consent decree" to which the plaintiff 
was not a party. Figures at 359. While it is unclear whether the plaintiff was seeking both 
damages and injunctive relief relating to violations of the consent decree, it appears from the 
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facts presented in the case that the plaintiff was seeking an injunction requiring the defendant 
to establish a promotional pool of qualified black employees as required by paragraph 5 of 
the Consent Decree. Id. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff "could not 
maintain an independent action to enforce the Consent Decree, because one could only bring 
this claim in the original case invoking the court's continuing jurisdiction over that matter." 
Id. at 361. While the court's use of the term "enforce" is left somewhat ambiguous because 
of the lack of given facts relating to the plaintiffs Consent Decree claim, Ricky Sanders 
understands the holding in this case to be that a claim for injunctive relief can only be 
brought in the original case. This position is supported by McNiel v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163 
(10th Cir. 1991). The McNiel court stated "[c]laims for equitable relief must be made 
through the class representative until the class action is over or the consent decree is 
modified." Id at 1166. Based on Figures and McNiel Ricky Sanders completely agrees that 
any claim requiring that the State Appellees comply with the terms of the Agreement would 
have to be made through the class action suit. Since Ricky Sanders has made no claim for 
equitable relief, Figures has no application to the question of whether a breach of contract 
action, an action that is clearly within the jurisdiction of the state courts, must be maintained 
in federal court simply because the basis for the claim is a contract that was reached 
pursuant to a federal court action. 
McNiel on the other hand, holds that a claim that falls within the scope of the class 
action lawsuit must be decided within the class action. However, if claims outside the scope 
of the class action or damage issues are raised, the action may be heard separately on its 
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merits. McNiel at 1167. Because Ricky Sanders breach of contract claim not only falls 
outside the scope of the David C. class action but also seeks damages rather than equitable 
relief, Ricky Sanders breach of contract claim may be maintained separately from the federal 
class action. 
Point 2 
A consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement 
purposes as a contract and the Third District Court has 
jurisdiction over breach of contract actions. 
The State Appellees admit that a consent decree or order is to be construed for 
enforcement purposes as a contract. State Appellees Brief at 19, Sinclair Oil Corp. v. 
Scherer, 7 F.3d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1993). The State Appellees do not contest that the Third 
District Court has jurisdiction of breach of contract actions. 
Point 3 
The question of whether the settlement agreement provides 
for damages is not on appeal and the State Appellees 
arguments regarding this issues should be ignored. 
The issue of whether the settlement agreement provides for a cause of action for 
damages is not on appeal. The only issue on appeal is whether the state court has jurisdiction 
over Ricky Sanders breach of contract action that is based on an agreement reached in a 
federal action. The trial court dismissed this cause of action because the trial court ruled it 
did not have jurisdiction, not because of what was or was not contained "within the four 
corners of the consent decree." Ricky Sanders only position regarding damages at this time 
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is that to the extent the State Appellees may show at trial that the consent decree failed to 
create any duties or obligation on the part of the State Appellees or to create any effective 
remedies in the event the State Appellees failed to comply with its terms is the extent to 
which the Attorney Appellees were negligent in their representation of Breanna Loveless. 
Conclusion 
Because Ricky Sanders breach of contract claim may be maintained separately from 
the class action lawsuit and was within the jurisdiction of the District Court, the District 
Court's dismissal of this claim should be overturned and should be remanded to District 
Court for further proceedings. 
ISSUE 4 
WRONGFUL DEATH - DIVISION 
The State Appellees correctly state that Ricky Sanders is only appealing the dismissal 
of his wrongful death claim as to the Division of Family Services and not as to the remaining 
State Appellees. The State Appellees are also correct that Ricky Sanders is asking this court 
to reverse its decision in Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist.. 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993). 
If this court is unwilling to overturn Ledfors and remands this matter to the District Court for 
further proceedings, Ricky Sanders asks this court to clarify, not reverse, the casual standard 
required by Utah Code Ann. §.63-30-10(2). 
Point 1 
The rule established in Ledfors was originally erroneous and 
should be overturned. 
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The State Appellees correctly state the standard that this court will follow the rule of 
law which it has established in earlier cases unless this court is clearly convinced that the 
rule was originally erroneous. State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994). Ricky 
Sanders' position is that the rule established in Ledfors was originally erroneous because this 
court failed to apply proper legal standards regarding statute interpretation. The proper 
standard is that the court is to first look to the plain language of the statute. If the court finds 
ambiguity in the statute's plain language, the court is to then seek guidance from the 
legislative history and relevant policy considerations. Ricky Sanders has presented his 
argument to the court that the plain language of the statute is ambiguous and that the court 
should seek guidance from the legislative history. Because the legislative history supports 
the position that immunity was only intended to be preserved where the injury is the result 
of an assault or battery committed by a government employee, Ledfors was incorrectly 
decided and should be overturned. Whether Ricky Sanders' argument has clearly convinced 
this court of its error is solely within the discretion of this court; however, the State 
Appellees appear to be convinced since they have made no attempt whatsoever to show that 
the Ledfors court did in fact apply proper legal standards regarding statute interpretation, that 
the statute is unambiguous, or that the legislative history supports a position other than the 
position propounded by Ricky Sanders. 
Point 2 
If this court is unwilling to overturn Ledfors, this court needs 
to clarify, not overturn, the causal standard required by 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(2). 
9 
The State Appellees choose to cling to the "some casual relationship" language found 
in Taylor v. Ogden Citv Sch. Dist. 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996) and to ignore the "but for" 
language that immediately follows. IdL at 159. The State Appellees claim to be immune as 
long as there is any casual relationship between Breanna's physical injuries and her death 
from pneumonia no matter how small or insignificant that connection might be. Is this the 
standard the Taylor court intended or did it intend to create a "but for" causal standard? 
Ricky Sanders is requesting that the court clarify this issue. 
Point 3 
Breanna's death did not arise out of, in connection with, or 
result from a battery as matter of law. 
The State Appellees have correctly stated that under existing case law, the issue of 
governmental immunity is determined by whether Breanna's injuries arose out of an assault 
or battery and not on whether State Appellees were negligent. Ricky Sanders has provided 
undisputed evidence that Breanna had a history of chronic and persistent infectious illnesses 
during the majority of her life. These infectious illnesses included chronic and persistent ear 
infections during the last five months of her life, a serious and persistent nose infection that 
increased in seriousness during the last month of her life, bronchitis within the last month 
of her life, an unidentified but potentially serious viral infection during the last month of her 
life. Breanna also had a history of chronic and persistent diarrhea that may have been caused 
by infection. Breanna experienced a weight loss unusual in a child her age that could 
indicate that Breanna was receiving insufficient nourishment. Breanna's mother had a history 
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of failing to seek timely medical treatment for Breannafs infectious illnesses and failing to 
administer, or even fill, prescribed medications. The Medical Examiner testified that it was 
possible that Breanna would have died even if she had not had blunt force trauma injuries. 
The medical examiner determined that Breanna had myocarditis, an infectious disease of the 
heart, which may have been sufficient in and of itself to be the cause of Breanna's death 
independent of the pneumonia. The stage of myocarditis revealed by Breanna's autopsy was 
sufficient to cause death even to a child who was perfectly healthy. None of Breanna's 
physical injuries were sufficient either individually or collectively to cause Breanna's death. 
Breanna's pneumonia and myocarditis were not caused by Breanna's physical injuries. The 
stage of pneumonia revealed by Breanna's autopsy was sufficient to cause death even to a 
child who was otherwise perfectly healthy. While the State Appellees have attempted to 
establish a causal link between Breanna's pneumonia and Breanna's physical injuries, the 
State Appellees have shown no connection between Breanna's myocarditis, a condition that 
could have been an independent the cause of her death, and her physical injuries. Based on 
the evidence that has been presented when viewed in the light most favorable to Ricky 
Sanders, the question of whether Breanna died of pneumonia or myocarditis and whether 
Breanna's physical injuries had no connection, some connection or a but for connection is 
clearly a question of fact that should be decided by a jury. For that reason, the trial court's 
ruling in favor of the State Appellees was erroneous. 
The facts relied on by the State Appellees to counter the evidence in support of Ricky 
Sanders are as follows: That Breanna was the victim of physical abuse, that Breanna's 
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mother was convicted of murder based on the theory that the physical abuse was casually 
related to Breanna's death from pneumonia, that the State Appellees expert witness testified 
that pneumonia is often the terminal event for a child who has been repeatedly battered, and 
that Ricky Sanders pled that the Breanna's pneumonia resulted from and was aggravated by 
the abuse and neglect to which she was subjected. Based on these facts, the State Appellees 
draw the conclusion that the evidence can only support a finding that some casual 
relationship between the physical abuse (battery) and her final death from pneumonia which 
is referred to as a "complication". State Appellees' Brief at 14. The error in the State 
Appellees argument is that the State Appellees conclusion is not supported by the facts when 
viewed in the light most favorable to Ricky Sanders. While it is undisputed that Breanna was 
the victim of physical abuse, it is also undisputed that Breanna was the victim of severe 
medical abuse and neglect as outlined above. If the stage of pneumonia revealed by 
Breanna's Autopsy was sufficient to cause death to a child who was otherwise perfectly 
healthy, it is certainly reasonable to infer that it was sufficient to cause death to a child who 
had suffered from chronic and persistent untreated infectious illnesses during the majority 
of her life. The issue of what contribution, if any, Breanna's physical injuries played in her 
death from pneumonia is a fact issue that should be decided by the jury given the evidence 
that has been presented when viewed in the light most favorable to Ricky Sanders. 
The State Appellees argue that the testimony of its own expert witness, Dr. Kirshner, 
who concluded that pneumonia is often the terminal event for a child who has been 
repeatedly battered is sufficient to overcome the significant evidence supporting Ricky 
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Sanders' position. They further argue Ricky Sanders has failed to negate whether some 
casual relationship existed between the pneumonia and the physical abuse (assault and 
battery). State Appellees' Brief at 15. However, this is a difficult issue to address given the 
uncertainty of the causal standard required by this court. Can it be reasonably inferred from 
the evidence that it was more likely than not that Breanna would have contracted pneumonia 
given Breanna's history of chronic infectious illness and her mothers repeated failure to seek 
and administer appropriate medical treatment? Absolutely. Can it be reasonably inferred 
from the evidence that it was more likely than not that Breanna would have died of 
pneumonia given the fact that Breanna's Mother had repeatedly demonstrated a callous 
disregard for Breanna health and welfare and failed to make any effort whatsoever to seek 
medical treatment for Breanna's fatal illness even though Breanna was on the death's 
doorstep? Absolutely. Would Breanna have been able to live just a few more seconds if she 
had not been physically abused and if so, is this the "some casual connection" that the State 
Appellees need to grasp in order to obtain governmental immunity? Ricky Sanders can only 
hope not, but the answer to this question is determined by the casual standard required by 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(2). At the same time, the State Appellees ignore the fact that 
they have completely failed to established any casual connection between Breanna's physical 
injuries and her myocarditis which could be a completely independent cause of Breanna's 
death. 
The remaining two facts relied on by the State Appellees have no merit and should 
be ignored. Ricky Sanders was not a party to the criminal action and any findings made in 
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the criminal matter are not binding in this action. Furthermore, it is a complete 
misrepresentation to claim that Breanna's mother was convicted based on the theory that the 
physical abuse was casually related to Breanna' s death from pneumonia. The State proposed 
multiple theories of murder in the criminal trial and it is completely unknown under which 
theory or theories the mother was convicted. The fact that the jury was not required to 
unanimously agree on a single theory of murder is the subject of a current appeal. The State 
Appellees also argue that Ricky Sanders pled that Breanna's physical abuse and neglect 
caused or contributed to her death. Ricky Sander pled no such thing. While the pleading 
refers to abuse and neglect, Ricky Sanders position is that the abuse and neglect referred to 
in the original complaint refers to medical abuse and neglect and not physical abuse and 
neglect. Furthermore, Ricky Sanders filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended 
Complaint. R. 649-668. This motion was determined to be moot because the trial judge 
ruled that the State Appellees were immune from suit. R. 750 at 32. Based on this, it is 
completely inaccurate for the State Appellees to argue that Ricky Sanders' pleadings claim 
that Breanna's pneumonia was caused by physical abuse because Ricky Sanders makes no 
such claim. 
Conclusion 
Branna's death did not arise out of, in connection with, or result from a battery as a 
matter of law. The District Courts order for summary judgment on behalf of the Division 
should be overturned and the Appellant's Wrongful Death claim against the Division should 
be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. The District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Attorney Appellees 
should be overturned and the Appellant's negligence cause of action against the 
Attorney Appellees should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. 
2. The District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Monitor Panel 
Appellees should be overturned and the Appellant's negligence cause of action 
against the Monitoring Panel Appellees should be remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
3. The District Court's dismissal of the appellant's Breach of Contract actions should 
be overturned and remanded to the district Court for further proceedings. 
4. The District Court's order for summary judgment on behalf of the Division should be 
overturned and the Appellant's Wrongful Death cause of action against the Division 
should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings because the Utah 
Supreme Court should overturn existing case law, or in the alternative, there are 
genuine issues of material fact that can only be resolved by a jury. 
Dated this 25th day of September, 2000. 
D. ?/2/~y 
D. Kevin DeGraw 
Attorney for Appellant 
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